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Abstract:  A  number  of  cross-country  comparisons  do  not  find  a  robust  negative  relationship 
between government size and economic growth. In part this may reflect the prediction in economic 
theory  that  a  negative  relationship  should  exist  primarily  for  rich  countries  with  large  public 
sectors.  In  this  paper  an  econometric  panel  study  is  conducted  on  a  sample  of  rich  countries 
covering  the  1970–95  period.  Extended  extreme  bounds  analyses  are  reported  based  on  a 
regression model that tackles a number of econometric issues. Our general finding is that the more 
econometric problems are addressed, the more robust the relationship between government size 
and economic growth appears. Our most complete specifications are robust even according to the 
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The explosive development in the theory of endogenous growth has stimulated a great deal of 
empirical work on the determinants of economic growth. In particular, the influential work by 
Barro (1991), using a data set covering a large cross-section of both rich and poor countries, 
appeared to present strong empirical evidence favoring the view that a large public sector is 
growth-impeding. This result has been confirmed in some subsequent studies (e.g., Engen and 
Skinner, 1992; Grier, 1997; Hansson and Henrekson, 1994; de la Fuente, 1997) but has been 
challenged in others. For example, Mendoza, Milesi-Ferreti and Asea (1997) and Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) find no discernible relation between government spending and growth. An 
explanation for the diversity of conclusions is illustrated by the extreme bounds analysis 
(EBA) that Levine and Renelt (1992) report. They analyze a large number of regressions with 
different combinations of conditioning variables. The negative partial correlation between 
government size and economic growth does not appear to be robust for some combinations of 
conditioning variables.1 
 
While it may be that theory does not give much guidance as to the ultimate effect of public 
expenditure on growth, it does give some guidance regarding how empirical studies should be 
specified. For example, mainstream theory – such as in Barro (1990) and Slemrod (1995) – 
predicts that we should only expect to find a negative effect in countries where the size of the 
government sector exceeds a certain threshold.2 With few exceptions, however, we only 
observe very large public sectors in rich countries.  
 
A closely related rationale for restricting the empirical analysis to a sample of rich countries is 
also stressed by Slemrod (1995). It is well known that the scope of government tends to 
increase with the level of income. This tendency is commonly called Wagner’s Law, and is 
often said to imply that the income elasticity of demand for government is larger than unity. 
But this relationship is weakened at the highest levels of income.3 Moreover, one should keep 
in mind that in the theoretical models, tax rates cause the detrimental growth effects, whereas 
in the empirical work tax rates are proxied by tax revenues. Since the tax compliance ratio 
increases with the level of development, tax revenue is a much better proxy for tax rates in 
rich countries than in poor countries (Easterly, 1995). 
 
The composition of public expenditure also differs between rich and poor countries. The 
                                                 
1 A similar agnostic conclusion is reached in three recent review articles: Slemrod (1995), Atkinson (1995) and 
Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson (1997). 
2 See also Tanzi and Zee (1997). 
3 Easterly and Rebelo (1993) show that there is a strong positive relationship between government size and per 
capita income both across a large sample of countries at a point in time (1985) and for a panel of 28 countries 
from 1870 to 1988. This relationship disappears only at the highest levels of income.    2 
various programs that have been hypothesized in theoretical work to have positive growth 
effects – e.g., schooling, infrastructure and R&D subsidies – typically amount to less than 
one-fifth of public expenditure in OECD countries, while they typically amount to more than 
half of public spending in less developed countries. This means that 80 percent or more of 
public expenditure in OECD countries consists of expenditure that is not often claimed to 
have positive growth effects. Moreover, most of the variance in public expenditure between 
countries is explained by differences in public expenditure that has not been claimed to have 
positive growth effects. There is an extensive literature indicating that many public programs 
have negative effects on saving and capital accumulation, and create marginal effects in 
addition to those that emanate from the tax system.4 
 
We conclude from this discussion that analyzing rich countries separately may add to our 
understanding of whether large public expenditure has negative growth effects. This 
conclusion is also consistent with the findings by Grier and Tullock (1989) who present 
evidence showing that data from the OECD and the rest of the world do not share a common 
set of coefficients and thus should not be pooled. A key question is still how to select rich 
countries. A common approach has been to use the sample of OECD countries. We also report 
regressions using the OECD sample. At the same time it is worth noting that this sample is 
not fully satisfactory. Countries are granted OECD membership partly based on good 
economic performance and high GDP levels, and partly based on other criteria, such as size, 
democracy and institutional structure. The effect of this selection could introduce a bias. For 
this reason we also run regressions using an objective income criterion to select a sample of 
rich countries. Moreover, we report extensive robustness tests including extreme bounds 
analyses based on a regression specification that addresses the issue of country selection as 
well as a number of other econometric issues. The robustness tests are extended by means of 
the extreme bounds analysis suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997). The basic idea of this 
extension is to examine the entire distribution of coefficient estimates rather than using an 
absolute criterion of robustness. 
 
In section 2 we present our basic empirical analysis, where we address a number of 
econometric issues. Section 3 contains an examination of potential business cycle effects and 
the results from estimations including additional rich countries. Section 4 reports the results of 
our robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Our Basic Test 
 
Many scholars (e.g., Plosser, 1993) have found a negative bivariate relationship between the 
                                                 
 4See Fölster and Henrekson (1999) for evidence and references corroborating the assertions in this paragraph.   3 
rate of growth and the measure of government size. It is well known that the inclusion of 
particular control variables can wipe out this bivariate relationship (e.g., Easterly and Rebelo, 
1993). Thus, one needs to carefully consider what variables to include in a growth regression. 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) collected around 60 variables, which had been found to be significant in 
at least one growth regression.  
 
Since growth theory suggests that growth is driven by accumulation, growth regressions 
usually include measures of the growth of the factors of production: physical capital, labor 
and human capital. In every regression below we therefore include gross investment as a share 
of GDP (INV), the growth rate of the labor force (DLAB), and the growth of human capital 
(DHUM), measured as the growth rate of the average years of schooling.5 Given the 
overwhelming support for (conditional) convergence in the empirical growth literature (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), we also include initial income (Y0) among the regressors that always 
appear in the regressions.6 Two measures of government size will be used: total taxes as a 
share of GDP (TAX) and total government expenditure as a share of GDP (GEXP).  
 
When this basic set-up is applied in a pure cross-section framework on a sample of OECD 
countries, we detect no effect of the government size variables (Table 1). As in most cross-
section studies initial income Y0 is taken as the beginning-of-period value, while government 
expenditure and taxes are measured as averages over the observed period.7  
 
The argument for cross-section studies over long time spans has been that less interesting 
short-to-medium term effects, such as business cycle effects, are thereby eliminated. We will 
return to this issue in more detail. First, however, a number of problems with cross-section 
studies using long time spans need to be discussed.  
 
The most important may be a potentially severe simultaneity problem. The cross-country 
regressions are usually based on average values of government spending and growth over 
long time periods, typically twenty-year periods or longer. Over long time spans the level of 
government spending is likely to be influenced by demographics, in particular an increasing 
share of elderly. Just to give an example, for OECD countries Agell et al. (1997) report a 
                                                 
5 This choice of explanatory variables can be derived from an aggregate production function. Alternatively, one 
could use the specification derived from the Solow growth model, which implies that the level rather than the 
change in human capital enters the regression.  
6 In regressions that include both rich and poor countries it is common to use the log of Y0 as the measure of 
initial income. Since we focus on rich countries only in this paper, the differences in Y0 are comparatively small, 
and it turns out that it makes little difference whether initial income is logged. Therefore, we report only 
regressions where Y0 is not expressed in logarithms. 
7 Since government expenditure and taxes change so much over a time span of several decades it would hardly 
be meaningful to regress beginning-of-period values of, say, taxes, over income growth. For initial income the 
argument is different, since subsequent changes in income are captured by the dependent variable, GDP-growth.   4 
correlation of 0.72 between the tax ratio and the percentage share of population aged 65 or 
above. At the same time the share of elderly is closely correlated with GDP. Higher incomes 
increase expected life spans. This means that if GDP increases faster over the twenty-year 
period, growth will be higher, but the share of elderly also increases and government spending 
rises. Thus, errors in the growth variable will affect GDP, demographics and taxes or 
government spending. As a result the independent variable, taxes or government spending as a 
share of GDP, is correlated with the error term in the growth regression. This bias could easily 
give rise to positive coefficient estimates for the effect of taxes on GDP growth, such as those 
indicated by Table 1.  
 
A second problem is that cross-section studies using long observation periods give rise to an 
endogenous selection of tax policy. Countries that do raise taxes and experience lower growth 
during the observation period are more likely to change policy stance and reduce taxes, such 
as Ireland did during the 1980's. In contrast, countries that raise taxes without experiencing a 
negative growth effect (such as Norway, which discovered oil along the way) are more likely 
to continue having high taxes. This means that cross-section studies over long time spans may 
fail to capture growth effects of fiscal policy due to such endogenous policy determination. 
 
 
Table 1  Cross-country OLS Regressions for the Growth Effect of Public Sector Size in 
  22 or 23 OECD Countries 1970–95. 
 
Explanatory variables  Expenditure  Taxation 
Constant  0.0086      (0.50)  0.012      (0.76) 
GEXP  0.018      (0.90)   
TAX    0.015      (0.64) 
Y0  –0.015**    (–2.90)  –0.014*   (–2.59) 
INV  0.082
(*)   (1.84)  0.074       (1.63) 
DLAB   0.227        (0.84)      0.154       (0.53) 
DHUM  –0.065     (–0.27)  –0.0056    (–0.02) 
No. of obs.  22  23 
Adjusted R
2   0.30  0.25 
 
Note: (*), * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses. All 
variables are measured as averages over the entire period. Turkey and Mexico are excluded from the sample, 
since they cannot be considered to be rich countries. A complete list of the included OECD countries is provided 
in the Appendix. 
 
A third, related problem with cross-section studies over long time spans is that they may be 
inefficient since they discard all information on within-country variation.8 Exploiting within-
                                                 
8 To our knowledge this point was first made by Grier and Tullock (1989).   5 
country variation is particularly interesting, since the dispersion across OECD countries of 
total government outlays as a share of GDP has increased substantially since 1960. In some 
countries, such as Sweden and Portugal, government size has continued to increase up to the 
present, while in others, such as the U.K. and the Netherlands, there has been little change or 
even a decline over the last 15 years. As a result, the expenditure ratio as of the mid 1990s 
varied between roughly 65 percent for Sweden and some 35 percent for the U.S. and Japan. 
An additional reason for using a panel data approach, as stressed by Islam (1995), lies in its 
ability to allow for differences in the aggregate production function across countries. 
 
While both the simultaneity effect and the use of within-country variation are arguments in 
favor of panel regressions with shorter time spans, there are also risks. When the period of 
observation is short, it is much less likely that the error in the growth regression will affect 
life expectancy and government spending in the same period. But in a panel regression with 
annual data it would be very important to estimate the proper lag structure. This would mean 
that several years of lagged government expenditure would have to be included in the 
regression, giving rise to multicollinearity. In addition, if the lag length varies over time and 
between countries, the lagged effects may not be captured properly anyway.  
 
As a compromise we focus mainly on combined cross-section time-series regressions using 
five-year periods. In keeping with most of the previous literature a control variable such as 
initial income is defined as GDP per capita at the beginning of the five-year period, while the 
explanatory variables government expenditure and taxes are averages over the respective five-
year period. Over the course of five years a good deal of the lagged effects are captured. 
 
This still leaves another important risk with panel regressions, namely the occurrence of short 
term covariation such as business cycle correlations that may, for example, give rise to 
increasing public expenditure for unemployment when the growth rate falls. We will address 
the issue of business cycle covariation carefully in the next section, where we show 
instrument variable regressions and regressions with panels using annual observations. 
 
Not all immediate effects need to be related to the business cycle however. Some long-term 
effects of changed fiscal policy may materialize quite quickly. For example, if a government 
announces expenditure or tax hikes there can be a rapid reaction in savings and investment 
and thus GDP growth, which might occur simultaneously or even before the change in fiscal 
policy is actually implemented. For this reason it would not be satisfactory to use only lagged 
fiscal variables as proxies, since these would fail to capture such immediate effects.  
   6 
Before proceeding to the results of the panel regressions, and further considering the issue of 
business cycle covariation, a number of other econometric issues should be mentioned. 
Heteroscedasticity most often appears in a form where the error term is correlated with one of 
the independent variables or with the dependent variable. This does not seem to be a problem 
in our data, however.9 We do have a potential problem with heteroscedasticity between 
countries.10 A standard solution to this problem, which we apply, is to use a weighted least 
squares procedure that weights countries inversely proportional to the standard deviation of 
the error term.11 An additional problem that we attempt to come to grips with is that panel 
data estimations may yield biased coefficient estimates when lagged dependent variables are 
included. In our case, initial income is a regressor which is also present in the dependent 
variable, the rate of growth per capita. We have therefore reestimated our regressions using 
the corrected least squares dummy variable estimator suggested by Kiviet (1995).12 This 
procedure led, however, to quite similar estimates in all specifications, so they are not 
reported here. 
 
In Table 2 the regression results are presented. Fixed country effects and fixed period effects 
are here taken into account by including dummies. The inclusion of period dummies prevents 
us from picking up a spurious correlation that could arise because most countries have 
experienced a reduction in the growth rate in the 1970s and 1980s. Country dummies take 
account of country-specific effects, such as culture and social norms. As shown by Islam 
(1995), neglecting unobserved differences in the aggregate production function between 
countries induces an omitted variables problem. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the panel estimation yields a highly significant negative growth effect for 
GEXP. The tax variable is negative, but not quite significant at the 10% level in a two-tail test 
(in the weighted regression the significance level is 10.2%). The estimated effects of GEXP 
are also somewhat larger, implying that an increase in the expenditure ratio by 10 percent of 
                                                 
9 Not surprisingly, therefore, common corrections for heteroscedasticity along these dimensions, such as the 
White (1980) and Newey-West (1987) corrections hardly change the results. A White test for heteroscedasticity 
yields an F-statistic of 1.07 in the tax equation (and 1.04 in the government spending equation), implying a 
probability of 0.41. Moreover, testing the relation between the error term and the independent and dependent 
variables one at a time does not yield a significant relationship in any instance.  
10 The likelihood ratio test for groupwise heteroscedasticity suggested by Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984) yields 
a 
2 of 139.7, which is significant at the 1% level.  
11 It is worth noting that the weighted least squares procedure we use is not biased even if the standard deviation 
of the error is correlated with the explanatory variable. To see this intuitively one need only recall that the central 
idea in the correction of traditional heteroscedasticity – where the error term is correlated with an explanatory 
variable – is precisely to weight observations by the values of the independent variable such as the tax rate. In 
our case, two points may be made. First, the correlation between the standard deviation of the error term and the 
tax rate is extremely weak and by no measure significant. Second, even if there was such a correlation, the 
weighted least squares procedure would not be biased.  
12 Kiviet (1995) derives a formula for the small sample bias of the within-group, or least squares dummy 
variable, estimator for the coefficients of a first-order dynamic panel data model, and shows that correcting the 
estimator with the calculated bias gives more robust results than various GMM or IV estimators.   7 
GDP is associated with an annual growth rate that is 0.7–0.8 percentage points lower. A 
straightforward explanation of this difference may be that a budget deficit has growth effects 
similar to that of taxation, which implies that government expenditure is a better measure of 
current and future taxation.  
 
 
Table 2  Panel Regressions for the Growth Effect of Taxation and Public Consumption in 23 
OECD Countries and Public Expenditure in 22 OECD Countries 1970–95 





















       




   




















































No. of obs.  115  115  109  109  115  115 
Adjusted R
2   0.46  0.82  0.56  0.88  0.52  0.83 
 
Note: (*), * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses. The 
regressors are measured as averages for the respective subperiods, except for Y0 which measures the income 
level in the initial year of each subperiod.  
 
 
Table 2 also shows the regular OLS regressions, leaving heteroscedasticity uncorrected. As 
expected, the standard errors of the estimates in these regressions are larger. Nevertheless, 
GEXP has a significant negative coefficient, while the coefficient for taxes is negative, but 
insignificant. In the Appendix we show similar regressions including all the standard 
regressors that are meaningful and available in a panel of rich countries. Both the tax and 
government expenditure coefficients are significant in the weighted regression specification. 
Other conditioning variables such as investment and human capital are not significant in 
Table 2. This is mainly a consequence of introducing country dummies into the regression   8 
equation, while the coefficients on the country dummies are quite significant.13 As noted 
above, neglecting differences across countries in the aggregate production function may 
induce an omitted variables bias. But these unobserved country differences arguably imply 
cross-country differences in investment opportunities and optimal capital-labor ratios. It is 
therefore not all that surprising to find that investment loses significance once country 
dummies are included. It is also the case that the statistical significance of the estimated effect 
of TAX and GEXP increases when INV is not included among the regressors. This is to be 
expected, because in this case the indirect effect of taxes on growth via investment is also 
captured by the government size variable. 
 
The regression specifications in the first four columns of Table 2 are subjected to the 
robustness tests we report in section 4. Many studies use government consumption rather than 
government expenditure as the explanatory variable of interest. For example, Grier (1997) 
finds strong negative effects of government consumption on growth. As shown in Table 2, 
government consumption (GCONS) is significantly negatively related to growth at the 1% 
level. Yet, in theory, the tax used to finance non-actuarial transfers should have the same 
growth effect as a tax that finances government consumption. Moreover, public financing of 
education, health care and other social policies are classified as government consumption in 
some countries and as transfers in others. For these reasons, we focus on total government 
expenditure rather than consumption in what follows.  
 
 
3.  Checking for Business Cycle Effects and an Extension of the Sample 
 
As noted above, the use of panel data itself mitigates long-run simultaneity problems that 
arise because, among other things, the demographic structure and political preferences change 
with rising income. But, shortening the period of observation may increase the risk of picking 
up a correlation driven by business cycle effects. However, this cyclical covariation should be 
at least partially removed by using five-year periods and by controlling for period effects 
using period dummies.  
 
A typical business cycle correlation might imply that government expenditure increases (e.g. 
in line with unemployment costs) when growth falls, while tax revenue would typically 
decrease. Further, an expansive fiscal policy can stimulate demand and thus growth. To check 
the importance of these correlations, we also entered control variables that vary with the 
business cycle such as unemployment. In Table 3 we present results when UNEMPL is added 
among the regressors. This hardly changes the results for GEXP, although the effect of the tax 
                                                 
13 All country dummies are significantly different from zero, and eight country dummies are significantly 
different from the average dummy coefficient (using the specification of the first column of Table 2).    9 
variable is somewhat weakened. Similar results are obtained using the change rather than the 
level of unemployment as an explanatory variable (not shown). The same is also true for 
regressions using beginning-of-period values for the fiscal variables (not shown).  
 
In order to further examine the possibility of business-cycle induced simultaneity, we estimate 
various specifications using first differences, instruments and potential output. Reporting all 
these would lead us too far off track. A typical result is shown in columns five and six of 
Table 3 for a specification with a first differences, two-stage weighted least squares regression 
using instruments for the tax and government variables.14 The coefficients on the tax and 
expenditure variables are still significant.15 
 
Table 3  Panel Regressions for the Growth Effect of Public Sector Size in 23/22 OECD 
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No. of obs.  115  115  109  109  65  64 
Adjusted R
2   0.46  0.81  0.55  0.88  0.61  0.86 
 
Note: (*), * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses. 
UNEMPL is defined as the average for each subperiod. 
 
                                                 
14 The use of first differences is often considered to be a more effective way of correcting for fixed country 
effects. The first difference of the tax and public expenditure variables are instrumented by the lagged levels of 
taxes and public expenditure, respectively, fixed country effects, and levels and first differences of the 
population and initial GDP variables. As the dependent variable we use growth of potential GDP per capita 
(from OECD, Economic Outlook). 
15 They become insignificant when the second lags of taxes and government expenditure are used. This is hardly 
surprising given that the number of degrees of freedom becomes very small.   10 
At this point one might reconsider the issue of using five period averages as observations. 
Presumably, if business cycle covariation were an important explanation for the link between 
government expenditure and growth, one would expect regressions using one-year periods to 
yield even more significant and larger coefficient estimates than our five-year periods.16 But, 
using one-year periods does not yield a stronger or more significant correlation than the five-
year estimates reported in Table 2. For example, the estimated coefficient for TAX in an OLS-
regression corresponding to the first column in Table 2 is –0.021 (t = –0.45). And the point 
estimate for GEXP corresponding to column 3 in Table 2 is actually positive, 0.025 (t = 0.78). 
 
In sum, there are serious issues of endogeneity both in cross-section studies using long 
periods of observation and in panel studies using short periods of observation. Our 
compromise of using five-year periods hardly settles this issue for good, but we hope to have 
shown that the results are not based on very short-term covariation over the business cycle. 
 
A further methodological issue of great potential relevance is the selection of a sample of rich 
countries. OECD countries are themselves selected among high-income countries, in part for 
their good growth performance, and in part according to other criteria, such as the existence of 
democracy. It would therefore be natural to analyze our question using a sample of rich 
countries which is not restricted by OECD membership. To examine this issue we extend our 
sample to all non-OPEC/non-tax haven countries that have a PPP-adjusted GNP per capita in 
1995, the final year of our inquiry, comparable to the OECD countries. These countries have 
been identified from World Bank (1997, table 1.1) and the most recent version of Penn World 
Tables. The countries thus included are Hong Kong, Singapore, Israel, Mauritius, Korea and 
Taiwan. The poorest of these countries is Korea with a PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of USD 
260 below the level in Greece. Next in line after Korea in terms of income per capita in 1995 
is Chile, USD 1,930 below the Korean level. This large gap between these two countries and a 
formal cluster analysis confirm that the 23 richest OECD countries plus the additional six 
                                                 
16 A number of studies, e.g., Blanchard & Perotti (1999), find a positive impact of fiscal policy on output using 
quarterly data.   11 
countries listed above constitute a reasonably well defined group of rich countries.17 Some 
interesting features of the additional countries plus Chile are displayed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4  Rich  non-OECD  Countries  Excluding  OPEC  Countries  and  Tax  Havens. 
  Countries with a PPP-adjusted GNP per Capita above the OECD Average Minus 
  Two  Standard  Deviations  in  1995,  Average  Growth  Rate  1980–95  (%)  and 
  Government Expenditure Share in 1995 (%). 
 
Country  GNP per capita 1995 
PPP dollars 
Growth rate of GDP 
per capita 1980–95 
Government expen-
diture as a share of 
GDP in 1995 
Chile  9,520  3.19  19.2 
Hong Kong  22,950  4.75  14.5 
Israel  16,490  2.16  44.7 
Korea  11,450  7.32  17.7 
Mauritius  13,210  4.65  23.3 
Singapore  22,770  5.64  14.4 
Taiwan  13,490  6.21  30.0 
 
Note: Tax havens excluded are Bahrain, Barbados, the Bahamas and St. Kitts and Nevis. GNP per capita in 
Taiwan in 1995 has been estimated – on the basis of Penn World Tables version 5.6 and World Bank (1997) – to 
be 50% of the U.S. level in 1995. 
Source: See Appendix.  
 
Table 5  Panel Regressions for the Growth Effect of Public Sector Size in 29/28 Rich 
















   




































No. of obs.  145  145  139  139 
Adjusted R
2   0.70  0.79  0.74  0.82 
Note: (*), * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses. 
                                                 
17 The formal cluster analysis also shows that it is reasonable to exclude the two poorest OECD countries, 
Turkey and Mexico, from the OECD regressions.   12 
 
Regressions for this extended sample of rich countries presented in Table 5 show an 
overwhelmingly strong relation between TAX or GEXP on the one hand, and growth on the 
other hand. OLS or weighted regressions notwithstanding, the estimated effect is highly 
significant. Quantitatively, the effect is estimated to be somewhat larger than before; a 10 
percentage points increase in public sector size is associated with a reduction of the growth 
rate of roughly one percentage point. 
 
 
4.  Robustness Tests 
 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the robustness of the regression results presented 
above. The point of departure for our robustness tests is Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds 
analysis (EBA), and Levine and Renelt’s (1992) empirical application of this test. Adopted to 
our context, this implies estimation of regressions of the form: 
 
         j xj zj yj j x b z b y b a   (1) 
 
where y is a vector of fixed variables that always appear in the regressions (Y0, INV, DLAB 
and DHUM), z denotes the variable of interest (TAX or GEXP) and xj is a vector of three 
variables taken from the pool X of additional plausible control variables. The regression 
model has to be estimated for the M possible combinations of xj X. For each model j one 
estimates bzj and the corresponding standard deviation zj. The lower extreme bound is 
defined as the lowest value of bzj – 2zj and the upper extreme bound is defined to be the 
largest value of bzj + 2zj. If the lower extreme bound is negative and the upper extreme 
bound is positive, the variable is considered not to be robust. 
 
Sala-i-Martin (1994) has two important objections against the Levine–Renelt methodology. 
First, he notes that there is a “reverse data-mining“ problem. The control variables are 
samples drawn with some error from the true population. Therefore, if one keeps trying 
different combinations of control variables one is almost guaranteed to find one or a 
combination of several control variables for which the error is such that it renders the 
coefficient of interest insignificant or even causes it to change sign. “The implication is that 
the extreme-bounds test may be too strong“ (p. 743). Second, Sala-i-Martin points out that 
Levine and Renelt in fact always find some group of policy variables that matter. The policy 
variables are so highly correlated that one often cannot distinguish between them, and the 
proxies used are always imperfect measures. Depending on the sample and the specific choice 
of explanatory variables, the data are likely to pick one variable or another because they are 
all close and imperfect indicators of the same phenomenon.    13 
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) has moved away from the EBA by looking at the whole distribution of 
the estimates of bz. We adhere to that approach in this paper. More specifically, we will 
reestimate the regressions above with all possible triplets of conditioning variables. From this 
exercise we can (i) conduct the EBA and (ii) compute the share of all regressions that result in 
a statistically negative effect of the government size variable.18  
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) applied 59 control variables used in the literature. On the other hand he 
limits himself to robustness tests of a cross-section of countries including both rich and poor 
countries. Many of his variables are irrelevant for a sample of rich countries, e.g., the black 
market premium, the number of revolutions and coups and the degree of civil liberties, or they 
are not available for several time periods. Furthermore, many variables are constant over the 
sample period. In our case, these variables are implicitly captured by the country dummies. 
These considerations have limited the number of control variables we can use considerably. 
We have collected the following eleven control variables: DEPPOP, EXP, FERT, IMP, INFL, 
OPEN, POP, SAV, TYR, URBAN, UNEMPL. The mnemonic names are largely self-
explanatory, but the interested reader is referred to the Appendix for full definitions of the 








 = 165 possible combinations of xj X.19 
 
The results from the robustness test for weighted regressions on the OECD sample using 11 
conditioning variables is presented in Table 6. We may first note that the GEXP coefficient is 
generally more robustly negative than the TAX coefficient; 73.8 percent of the GEXP 
estimates are negative and significant compared to 43.9 percent for the TAX estimates. The 
estimated effects are not robust with respect to the stringent EBA criterion.  
 
Upon closer inspection one can detect a strong negative correlation between savings and 
government expenditure. This is not all that surprising since national saving actually includes 
government saving directly via an accounting identity, giving rise to multicollinearity 
between a conditioning variable and the variable of interest.  
 
To check how important this multicollinearity problem is, we conduct two further sensitivity 
analyses. First, we exclude SAV from the set of conditioning variables. As reported in Table 
6a the GEXP coefficient now becomes robust according to the Levine-Renelt EBA criterion 
                                                 
18 Sala-i-Martin (1997) also suggests a method for computing the fraction of the cumulative distribution of bz 
lying to the left of zero. This computation requires assumptions regarding the distribution of the estimator bz and 
a choice of an appropriate weighting scheme. The statistical foundation of this procedure is yet unclear so we 
refrain from reporting these computations here, but they are available upon request from the authors. 
19 Since OPEN is a linear combination of EXP and IMP the regression containing these three variables together 
cannot be estimated. Thus, the total number of equations is reduced to 164.   14 
as well. The robustness of the TAX coefficient is increased considerably. Now 59.7 percent of 
all estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, in Table 6b we 
report the results from a full robustness test with eleven conditioning where SAV is replaced 
by private saving as a share of GDP (PSAV). The results in this case are stronger than in the 
case when SAV is just excluded: GEXP is still robust according to the stringent EBA criterion 




Table 6b  Robustness Tests for the OECD Sample with Eleven and Ten Conditioning Variables. 
 
  Eleven Conditioning Variables  Ten Conditioning Variables 
  TAX  GEXP  TAX  GEXP 
EBA lower bound  –0.202  –0.164  –0.202  –0.164 
EBA upper bound  0.103  0.043  0.044  –0.028 
% significant†  43.9  73.8  59.7  100.0 
†The share of all regressions resulting in an estimate of bzj that is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 6b  Robustness Test for the OECD Sample when Private Saving Substitutes for Total 
Saving (as a share of GDP). 
 
  TAX  GEXP 
EBA lower bound  –0.243  –0.172 
EBA upper bound  0.044  –0.023 
% significant  70.7  100.0 
 
Finally, Table 7 reports analogous robustness tests for the sample of all rich countries 
excluding Taiwan (due to the extremely limited data availability). Since data for all countries 
were not available for SAV and UNEMPL, we only have nine conditioning variables. Both the 
TAX and GEXP coefficients are robustly negative according to the EBA criterion, which is the 
same as to say that all possible regressions yield negative and statistically significant 
estimates for the government size variables.  
 
 
Table 7  Robustness Test for all Rich Countries with Nine Conditioning Variables. 
 
  Weights  TAX  GEXP 
EBA lower bound    –0.199  –0.179 
EBA upper bound    –0.010  –0.052 
% significant†    100.0  100.0 
†The share of all regressions resulting in an estimate of bzj that is negative and significant at the 5% level.   15 
 
In sum, the robustness tests seem to imply that there is a robust relation between high public 
expenditure and lower growth. Even the stringent EBA criterion is met for the OECD sample 
with ten conditioning variables. The robustness results are less clear-cut for the TAX variable. 
The EBA criterion is not satisfied for the OECD sample, although it is noteworthy that in the 
case when SAV is excluded from the set of conditioning variables 60 percent of the TAX 
coefficients are significant. For the extended sample of rich countries, the tax variable also 
satisfies the stringent EBA criterion. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Empirical studies of the relation between government size and economic growth have come to 
widely different conclusions. In this paper an econometric panel study on a sample of rich 
countries covering the 1970–95 period is conducted. A main motivation for our analysis is 
that tests of robustness such as extreme bounds analyses now are used routinely to examine 
various relationships. Often the basic regression used in these tests contains numerous, and 
unnecessary, econometric problems. Our contention is that extreme bounds analyses based on 
such regression specifications are highly doubtful. In general, it is hardly possible to solve all 
econometric problems. But it is informative to examine what happens to robustness tests such 
as the EBA when at least some of the econometric issues are addressed. 
 
In the case of the relationship between public expenditure and economic growth it appears 
that exploiting within-country variation by means of panel regressions, correcting for 
heteroscedasticity between countries, and addressing the issue of country selection, in fact 
permits a more robust conclusion. The results point to a robust negative relationship between 
government expenditure and growth in rich countries. The size of the estimated coefficients 
imply that an increase of the expenditure ratio by 10 percentage points is associated with a 
decrease in the growth rate on the order of 0.7–0.8 percentage points. When the rich country 
sample is extended to non-OECD countries both government expenditure and taxation are 
found to be negatively associated with economic growth. These findings are robust even 





Appendix: Data description and supplementary regressions 












; B = beginning of 
period, E = end of period. 
   16 
Data for government expenditure were missing for New Zealand, and for Luxembourg they were missing after 
1986. As a result the GEXP-regressions contains one country less throughout, and likewise there are only four 
observations for Luxembourg. 
 
There are no data available for DHUM and TYR for Luxembourg. Instead we have used the average for Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Several measures were taken to check whether our results could be misleading as a result of 
the use of this proxy. The exclusion of Luxembourg altogether either strengthened or did not affect the results. 
We also applied the suggested method of Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, pp. 222–3) where DHUM for 
Luxembourg was estimated from a regression of DHUM against all other explanatory variables. In no case did 
the point estimate change at all, and the t-value was either unchanged or changed by no more than 0.01 in either 
direction. All these additional results are available upon request. 
 
TYR is only available every five years and the latest observation is for 1990. Thus, TYR takes the value of the 
first year in the respective periods, and DHUM is lagged one period. 
 
No observations for SAV were available for 1971. The average for the 1971–75 period is therefore calculated as 
the average for the 1972–75 period. 
 
The included OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Dependent variable     
DGDP  Average annual growth rate of GDP per 
head, 1990 prices and exchange rates 
OECD (2), WDI, IMF Fin., Taipei, 
Penn World Tables ver. 5.6 
     
Variables of interest     
TAX  Total taxes as a fraction of GDP, current 
prices 
OECD (7), WDI, IMF Gov., Hong 
Kong Trade Development Council, 
Taipei  
GEXP  Government expenditure as a fraction of 
GDP, current prices 
OECD (4), IMF Gov., Hong Kong 
Trade Development Council, Taipei 
     
Variables always included   
Y0  Initial GDP per head, current prices and 
current PPPs, OECD = 1, initial year for 
each subperiod 
OECD (1), Penn World Tables ver. 5.6 
INV  Investment as a fraction of GDP, current 
prices 
OECD (6), IMF Fin., Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council, Taipei 
DHUM  Annual growth rate of the average years 
of schooling in the total population,  
Barro and Lee (1996), data downloaded 
from the NBER home page 
DLAB  Average annual growth rate of the labor 
force 
OECD (4), WDI, Taipei  
     
EBA variables     
DEPPOP  Population aged 0–15 and 65– as a 
fraction of total population 
WDI 
EXP  Export of goods and services as a 
fraction of GDP, current prices 
WDI, IMF Fin. 
FERT  Fertility rate, births per woman  WDI 
IMP  Import of goods and services as a 
fraction of GDP, current prices 
WDI, IMF Fin. 
INFL  Percentage change p.a. in the consumer 
price index 
WDI 
OPEN  Export plus import of goods and 
services as a fraction of GDP, current 
prices 
WDI, IMF Fin. 
POP  Total population, in thousands  WDI   17 
PSAV  Gross private saving as a fraction of 
GDP, current prices 
OECD (3), OECD (5) 
SAV  Gross national saving as a fraction of 
GDP, current prices 
OECD (3), OECD (5) 
TYR  Average years of schooling in the total 
population 
Barro and Lee (1996), data downloaded 
from the NBER home page 
UNEMPL  Unemployment as a share of the labor 
force 
OECD (4) 





IMF Fin. = IMF, International Financial Statistics, various volumes. 
IMF Gov. = IMF, Government Finance Statistics, various volumes. 
OECD (1) = OECD, National Accounts Main Aggregates, Vol. 1, 1960–1994, 1996. 
OECD (2) = OECD, National Accounts Main Aggregates, Vol. 1, 1960–1996, 1998. 
OECD (3) = OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 48, December 1990. 
OECD (4) = OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 60, December 1996. 
OECD (5) = OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 62, December 1997. 
OECD (6) = OECD, Historical Statistics, various issues. 
OECD (7) = OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965–1996, 1997. 
WDI = World Bank (1997), World Development Indicators. Book and CD-ROM. Washington D.C. 




Table A1 Panel Regressions for the Growth Effect of Public Sector Size in 23/22 OECD 

















   




No. of obs.  115  115  109  109 
Adjusted R
2   0.56  0.79  0.60  0.85 
 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses. The regressors 
are measured as averages for the respective subperiods, except for Y0 which measures the income level in the 
initial year of each subperiod. The control variables included are listed in the data description above. For reasons 
spelled out in the text SAV is not included among the regressors. 
 
   18 
References 
 
Agell, J., T. Lindh and H. Ohlsson, 1997, Growth and the public sector: A critical review essay, European 
Journal of Political Economy 13, 33–52. 
Atkinson, A.B., 1995, The welfare state and economic performance, National Tax Journal 47, 171–198. 
Barro, R.J., 1990, Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth, Journal of Political 
Economy 98, S103–S125. 
Barro, R.J., 1991, Economic growth in a cross section of countries, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 407–
443. 
Barro, R.J. and J.W Lee, 1996, International measures of schooling years and schooling quality, American 
Economic Review 86, 218–223. 
Easterly, W., 1995, Comment on Slemrod, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 419–424. 
Easterly, W. and S. Rebelo, 1993, Fiscal policy and economic growth: An empirical investigation, Journal of 
Monetary Economics 32, 417–458 
Engen, E.M. and J. Skinner, 1992, Fiscal policy and economic growth, NBER Working Paper No. 4223. 
Fomby, T.B., C.R Hill and S.R. Johnson, 1984, Advanced econometric methods (Springer Verlag, New York). 
Fuente, A. de la, 1997, Fiscal policy and growth in the OECD, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1755. 
Fölster, S. and M. Henrekson 1999, Growth and the public sector: A critique of the critics, European Journal of 
Political Economy 15, 337–358. 
Grier, K.B., 1997, Governments, unions and economic growth, in: V. Bergström, ed., Government and Growth 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
Grier, K.B. and G. Tullock, 1989, An empirical analysis of cross-national economic growth 1951–80, Journal of 
Monetary Economics 24, 259–276. 
Hansson, P. and M. Henrekson, 1994, A new framework for testing the effect of government spending on growth 
and productivity, Public Choice 81, 381–401. 
Islam, N., 1995, Growth empirics: A panel data approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 1127–1170. 
Kiviet, J.F., 1995, “On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic panel data models, 
Journal of Econometrics 68, 53–78. 
Leamer, E.E., 1983, Let’s take the con out of econometrics, American Economic Review 73, 31–43. 
Levine, R. and D. Renelt, 1992, A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions, American Economic 
Review 82, 942–963. 
Mendoza, E.G., G.M. Milesi-Ferretti and P. Asea, 1997, On the ineffectiveness of tax policy in altering long-run 
growth: Harberger’s superneutrality conjecture, Journal of Public Economics 66(1), 99–126. 
Newey, W. and K. West, 1987, A simple positive semi-definite heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix, Econometrica 55, 703–708. 
Plosser, C., 1993, The search for growth, in: Policies for Long-Run Growth (The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City symposium series, Kansas City, MO).  
Pindyck, R.S. and D.L. Rubinfeld, 1991, Econometric models and econometric forecasts (McGraw-Hill, New 
York). 
Sala-i-Martin, X., 1994, Cross-sectional regressions and the empirics of economic growth, European Economic 
Review 38, 739–747. 
Sala-i-Martin, X., 1997, I just ran four million regressions, NBER Working Paper No 6252. 
Slemrod, J., 1995, What do cross-country studies teach about government involvement, prosperity, and 
economic growth?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 373–431. 
Tanzi, V. and H.H. Zee, 1997, Fiscal policy and long-run growth, IMF Staff Papers 44, 179–209. 
White, H., 1980, A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817–838. 
World Bank, 1997, World development indicators, in book form and on CD-ROM (Washington D.C.). 
 